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Abstract 
Science is often perceived to be a self-correcting enterprise. In principle, the assessment of 
scientific claims is supposed to proceed in a cumulative fashion, with the reigning theories of 
the day progressively approximating truth more accurately over time. In practice, however, 
cumulative self-correction tends to proceed less efficiently than one might naively suppose. 
Far from evaluating new evidence dispassionately and infallibly, individual scientists often 
cling stubbornly to prior findings. Here we explore the dynamics of scientific self-correction 
at an individual rather than collective level. In thirteen written statements, researchers from 
diverse branches of psychology share why and how they have lost confidence in a published 
finding. We qualitatively characterize these disclosures and explore their implications. A 
cross-disciplinary survey suggests that such loss-of-confidence sentiments are surprisingly 
common among members of the broader scientific population, yet rarely become part of the 
public record. We argue that removing barriers to self-correction at the individual level is 
imperative if the scientific community as a whole is to achieve the ideal of efficient self-
correction. 
Keywords: self-correction, knowledge accumulation, metascience, scientific falsification, 
incentive structure, scientific errors  
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Putting the Self in Self-Correction: Findings from the Loss-of-Confidence Project 
Science is often hailed as a self-correcting enterprise. In the popular perception, 
scientific knowledge is cumulative and progressively approximates truth more accurately 
over time (Sismondo, 2010). However, the degree to which science is genuinely self-
correcting is a matter of considerable debate. The truth may (or may not) be revealed 
eventually, but errors can persist for decades; corrections sometimes reflect lucky accidents 
rather than systematic investigation, and can themselves be erroneous; and initial mistakes 
might give rise to subsequent errors before they get caught (Allchin, 2015). Furthermore, 
even in a self-correcting scientific system, it remains unclear how much of the knowledge 
base is credible at any given point in time (Ioannidis, 2012), since the pace of scientific self-
correction may be far from optimal. 
Usually, self-correction is construed as an outcome of the activities of the scientific 
community as a whole (i.e., collective self-correction): watchful reviewers and editors catch 
errors before studies get published; critical readers write commentaries when they spot flaws 
in somebody else’s reasoning; replications by impartial groups of researchers allow the 
scientific community to update their beliefs about the likelihood that a scientific claim is true. 
Far less common are cases in which researchers publicly point out errors in their own studies, 
and question conclusions they have drawn before (i.e., individual self-correction). The 
perceived unlikeliness of such an event is facetiously captured in Max Planck’s famous 
statement that new scientific truths become established not because their enemies see the 
light, but because those enemies eventually die (Planck, 1948). However, even if individual 
self-correction is not necessary for a scientific community as a whole to be self-correcting in 
the long run (Mayo-Wilson, Zollman, & Danks, 2011), we argue that it can increase the 
overall efficiency of the self-corrective process and thus contribute to a more accurate 
scientific record. 
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The Value of Individual Self-Correction 
The authors of a study have privileged access to details about how the study was 
planned and conducted, how the data were (pre-)processed, and which analyses were 
performed. Thus, the authors remain in a special position to identify or confirm a variety of 
procedural, theoretical and methodological problems that are less visible to other 
researchers.1 Even when the relevant information can in principle be accessed from the 
outside, correction by the original authors might still be associated with considerably lower 
costs. For an externally instigated correction to take place, skeptical "outsiders" who were not 
involved in the research effort might have to carefully reconstruct methodological details 
from a scant methods section (see, e.g., Chang, Li, et al., 2018; Hardwicke et al., 2018, for 
evidence that often, authors’ assistance is required to reproduce analyses); write persuasive 
emails to get the original authors to share the underlying data (often to no avail; Wicherts, 
Bakker, & Molenaar, 2011); recalculate statistics, as reported values are not always accurate 
(e.g., Nuijten, Hartgerink, van Assen, Epskamp, & Wicherts, 2016); or apply advanced 
statistical methods to assess evidence in the presence of distortions such as publication bias 
(Carter, Schönbrodt, Gervais, & Hilgard, 2019). 
Eventually, external investigators might resort to an empirical replication study to 
clarify the matter. A replication study can be a very costly or even impossible endeavor. 
Certainly, it is inefficient when a simple self-corrective effort by the original authors might 
have sufficed. Widespread individual self-correction would obviously not eliminate the need 
for replication, but it would enable researchers to make better-informed choices about 
whether and how to replicate—with over 30 million scientific articles published since 1965 
                                                
1	Guidelines	to	promote	openness	(e.g.,	Nosek	et	al.,	2015)	might	partly	reduce	this	asymmetry	
and	thus	make	it	easier	for	third	parties	to	spot	flaws.	
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(Pan, Petersen, Pammolli, & Fortunato, 2018), limited research resources should not be 
expended mindlessly on attempts to replicate everything (see also Coles, Tiokhin, Scheel, 
Isager, & Lakens, 2018). In some cases, individual self-correction could render an empirical 
replication study unnecessary. In other cases, additionally disclosed information might render 
an empirical replication attempt even more interesting. And in any case, full information 
about the research process, including details that make the original authors doubt their claims, 
would help external investigators maximize the informativeness of their replication or follow-
up study. 
Lastly, in many areas of science, scientific correction has become a sensitive issue 
often discussed with highly charged language (Bohannon, 2014). Self-correction could help 
defuse some of this conflict. A research culture in which individual self-corrections are the 
default reaction to errors or misinterpretations could raise awareness that mistakes are a 
routine part of science and help separate researchers’ identities from specific findings. 
The Loss-of-Confidence Project 
To what extent does our research culture resemble the self-correcting ideal, and how 
can we facilitate such behavior? To address these questions, and to gauge the potential 
impacts of individual self-corrections, we conducted the Loss-of-Confidence Project. The 
effort was born out of a discussion in the Facebook group PsychMAP following the online 
publication of Dana Carney’s statement “My Position on Power Poses” (Carney, 2016). 
Carney revealed new methodological details regarding one of her previous publications and 
stated that she no longer believed in the originally reported effects. Inspired by her open 
disclosure, we conducted a project consisting of two parts: an open call for loss-of-confidence 
statements, and an anonymous online survey. 
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First, in our open call, we invited psychological researchers to submit statements 
describing findings that they had published and in which they had subsequently lost 
confidence.2 The idea behind the initiative was to help normalize and de-stigmatize 
individual self-correction, while (hopefully) also rewarding authors for exposing themselves 
in this way with a publication. We invited authors in any area of psychology to contribute 
statements expressing a loss of confidence in previous findings, subject to the following 
requirements: 
1. The study in question was an empirical report of a novel finding; 
2. The submitting author has lost confidence in the primary/central result 
of the paper; 
3. The loss of confidence occurred primarily as a result of theoretical or 
methodological problems with the study design or data analysis; 
4. The submitting author takes responsibility for the errors in question. 
The goal was to restrict submissions to cases where the stigma of disclosing a loss of 
confidence in previous findings would be particularly high; we therefore did not accept cases 
where an author had lost faith in a previous finding for reasons that did not involve their own 
mistakes (e.g., due to a series of failed replications by other researchers). 
Second, to understand whether the statements received in the first part of the project 
are outliers, or reflectf a broader phenomenon that goes largely unreported, we carried out an 
online survey and asked respondents about their experience with losses of confidence. 
Supplementary Table 1 provides the full list of questions asked. The link to the survey was 
posted on Facebook pages and mailing lists oriented towards scientists (Psych MAP, 
                                                
2	An	archived	version	of	the	website	can	be	found	at	
https://web.archive.org/web/20171212055615/https://lossofconfidence.	
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Psychological Methods Discussion Group, International Social Cognition Network, JDM 
Society, SJDM mailing list), and further promoted on Twitter. Survey materials and 
anonymized data are made available on the project’s OSF repository (https://osf.io/bv48h). 
Results: Loss-of-Confidence Statements 
The project was disseminated widely on social media (resulting in around 4,700 page 
views of the project website), and public commentary was overwhelmingly positive, 
highlighting how individual self-correction is aligned with perceived norms of scientific best 
practices. By the time we stopped the initial collection of submissions (December 2017 to 
July 2018), we had received Loss-of-Confidence statements pertaining to six different 
studies. After posting a preprint of an early version of this manuscript, we re-opened the 
collection of statements and received seven more submissions, some of them while finalizing 
the manuscript. Table 1 provides an overview of the statements we received.3 
 In the following, we list all statements in alphabetical order of the first author of the 
original study to which they pertain. Some of the statements have been abbreviated, the long 
versions are available on the OSF (https://osf.io/bv48h/). 
Statement on Carlsson and Björklund (2010) by Rickard Carlsson 
In this study, we developed a new way to measure mixed (in terms of warmth and 
competence) stereotypes with the help of the implicit association test (IAT). In two studies, 
respondents took two IATs and results supported the predictions: Lawyers were implicitly 
stereotyped as competent (positive) and cold (negative) relative to preschool teachers. In 
retrospect, there are a number of issues with the reported findings. First, there was 
                                                
3 Readers are cautioned to infer nothing about original authors who did not join or sign a loss-of-confidence 
statement about their own paper. In some cases, these authors approved of the submission but did not get 
involved otherwise; in others, they had already left the field of research. 
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considerable flexibility in what counted as support for the theoretical predictions. In 
particular, the statistical analysis in Study 2 tests a different hypothesis than Study 1. This 
analysis was added after peer review round 2 and thus was definitely not predicted a priori. 
Later, when trying to replicate the reported analysis from Study 1 on the data from Study 2, I 
found that only one of the two effects reported in Study 1 could be successfully replicated. 
Second, when we tried to establish the convergent and discriminant validity of the IATs by 
correlating them with explicit measures, we committed the fallacy of taking a nonsignificant 
effect in an underpowered test as evidence for the null hypothesis, which, in this case, 
implied discriminant validity. Third, in Study 1, participants actually took a third IAT which 
measured general attitudes towards the groups. This IAT was not disclosed in the manuscript 
and was highly correlated with both the competence and the warmth IAT. Hence, it would 
have complicated our narrative and undermined the claim that we had developed a 
completely new measure. Fourth, data from an undisclosed behavioral measure was collected 
but never entered into dataset or analyzed because I made a judgement that it was invalid 
based on debriefing of the participants. In conclusion, in this 2010 article I claimed to have 
developed a way to measure mixed stereotypes of warmth and competence with the IAT. I 
am no longer confident in this finding. 
Statement on Chabris and Hamilton (1992) by Christopher F. Chabris 
This paper reported a divided-visual-field (DVF) experiment showing that the skilled 
pattern recognition that chess masters perform when seeing a chess game situation was 
performed faster and more accurately when the stimuli were presented briefly in the left 
visual field, and thus first reached the right hemisphere of the brain, than when the stimuli 
were presented in the right field. The sample was large for a study of highly skilled 
performers (16 chess masters), but we analyzed the data in many different ways and reported 
the result that was most favorable. Most critically, we tried different rules for removing 
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outlier trials, and picked one that was uncommon but led to results consistent with our 
hypothesis. Nowadays I would analyze this type of data using more justifiable rules, and pre-
register the rules I was planning to use (among other things), to avoid this problem. For these 
reasons I no longer think that the results provide sufficient support for the claims that the 
right hemisphere is more important than the left for chess expertise and for skilled visual 
pattern recognition. These claims may be true, but not because of our experiment. 
Two other relevant things happened with this paper. First, we submitted a manuscript 
describing two related experiments. We were asked to remove the original Experiment 1 
because the p value for the critical hypothesis test was below .10 but not below .05. We 
complied with this request. We were also asked by one reviewer to run approximately ten 
additional analyses of the data. We did not comply with this—instead, we wrote to the editor 
and explained that doing so many different analyses of the same data set would invalidate the 
p values. The editor agreed. This is evidence that the dangers of multiple testing were not 
exactly unknown as far back as the early 1990s. The sacrificed Experiment 1 became a 
chapter of my Ph.D. thesis. I tried to replicate it several years later, but I could not recruit 
enough chess master participants. Having also lost some faith in the DVF methodology, I put 
that data in the “file drawer” for good. 
Statement on Fisher et al. (2015) by Ben Jones and Lisa M. DeBruine 
The paper reported that women’s preferences for wearing makeup that was rated by 
other people as being particularly attractive were stronger in test sessions where salivary 
testosterone was high than in test sessions where salivary testosterone was relatively low. Not 
long after publication, we were contacted by a colleague who had planned to use the open 
data and analysis code from our paper for a workshop on mixed effect models. They 
expressed some concerns about how our main analysis had been set up. Their main concern 
was that our model did not include random slopes for key within-subject variables (makeup 
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attractiveness and testosterone). Having looked into this issue over a couple of days, we 
agreed that not including random slopes typically increases false positive rates and that, in the 
case of our study, the key effect for our interpretation was no longer significant. To minimise 
misleading other researchers, we contacted the journal immediately and asked to retract the 
paper. While this was clearly an unfortunate situation, it highlights the importance of open 
data and analysis code for allowing mistakes to be quickly recognised and the scientific 
record corrected accordingly. 
Statement on Heyman, Van Rensbergen, Storms, Hutchison, and De Deyne (2015) by 
Tom Heyman 
The goal of the study was to assess whether the processes that presumably underlie 
semantic priming effects, are automatic in the sense that they are capacity-free. For instance, 
one of the most well-known mechanisms is spreading activation, which entails that the prime 
(e.g., cat) pre-activates related concepts (e.g., dog), thus resulting in a head start. In order to 
disentangle prospective processes, those initiated upon presentation of the prime like 
spreading activation, from retrospective processes, those initiated upon presentation of the 
target, three different types of stimuli were selected. Based on previously gathered word 
association data, we used symmetrically associated word pairs (e.g., cat–dog; both prime and 
target elicit one another) as well as asymmetrically associated pairs in the forward direction 
(e.g., panda–bear; the prime elicits the target, but not vice versa) and in the backward 
direction (e.g., bear–panda; the target elicits the prime, but not vice versa). However, I now 
believe that this manipulation was not successful in teasing apart prospective and 
retrospective processes. Critically, the three types of stimuli do not solely differ in terms of 
their presumed prime–target association. That is, I overlooked a number of confounding 
variables, for one because a priori matching attempts did not take regression effects into 
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account (see supplementary statement for more details). Unfortunately, this undercuts the 
validity of the study’s central claim. 
Statement on Lucas and Diener (2001) by Richard E. Lucas 
The paper reported three studies that examined the types of situations that extraverts 
enjoy. Our goal was to assess whether—as intuition and some models of personality might 
suggest—extraverts are defined by their enjoyment of social situations, or whether extraverts 
are actually more responsive to the pleasantness of situations regardless of whether these are 
social. We concluded that extraversion correlated more strongly with ratings of pleasant 
situations than unpleasant situations, but not more strongly with social situations than 
nonsocial situations once pleasantness was taken into account. There are two primary reasons 
why I have lost confidence in this result. First, the sample sizes are simply too small for the 
effect sizes one should expect (Schönbrodt & Perugini, 2013). I do not remember how our 
sample size decisions were made, and the sample sizes vary substantially across studies even 
though the design was essentially the same. This is especially important given that one 
important effect from the third and largest study would not have been significant with the 
sample sizes used in Studies 1 and 2. We did report an internal meta-analysis; but I have 
become convinced that these procedures cannot correct for other problematic research 
practices (Vosgerau, Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2019). Second, many participants 
were excluded from our final analyses. Two participants were excluded because they were 
outliers who strongly affected the results. We were transparent about this and reported 
analyses with and without these outliers. However, the results with the outliers included do 
not support our hypothesis. We also excluded a second group because their results seemed to 
indicate that they had misinterpreted the instructions. I still find our explanation compelling, 
and it may indeed be correct. However, I believe that the appropriate step would be to rerun 
the study with new procedures that could prevent this misunderstanding. Because we would 
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never have been motivated to look for signs that participants misunderstood the instructions if 
the results had turned out the way we wanted in the first place, this is an additional researcher 
degree of freedom that can lead to unreplicable results. 
Statement on Schmukle, Liesenfeld, Back, and Egloff (2007) by Stefan C. Schmukle 
The original main finding was that the implicit gender self-concept measured with the 
Implicit Association Test (IAT) significantly correlated with 2D:4D ratios for men (r = .36, p 
= .02), but not for women. We used two different versions of a gender IAT in this study (one 
with pictures and one with words as gender-specific stimuli; r = .46), and we had two 
different 2D:4D measures (the first measure was based on directly measuring the finger 
lengths using a caliper, the second was based on measuring the scans of the hands; r = .83). 
The correlation between IAT and 2D:4D was, however, only significant for the combination 
of picture IAT and 2D:4D scan measure, but insignificant for other combinations of IAT and 
2D:4D measures. When I was writing the manuscript, I thought that the pattern of results 
made sense, because a) the literature suggested that for an IAT pictures were better suited as 
stimuli than words, and because b) I assumed that the scan measures should lead to better 
results for psychometric reasons (as measurements were averaged across two raters). 
Accordingly, I only reported the results for the combination of picture IAT and 2D:4D scan 
measure in the article (for all results see the long version of the Loss-of-Confidence 
statement). In the meantime, I have lost confidence in this finding and I now think that the 
positive association between the gender IAT and 2D:4D is very likely a false-positive result, 
because I should have corrected the p value for multiple testing. 
Statement on Silberzahn and Uhlmann (2013) by Raphael Silberzahn and Eric 
Uhlmann 
In 2013 we published a paper providing evidence that the meaning of a person’s name 
might affect her career outcomes. In a large archival dataset with over 200,000 observations, 
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we found that German professionals with noble-sounding last names such as Kaiser 
("emperor"), König ("king"), and Fürst ("prince") were more often found as managers 
compared to German people with common, ordinary last names such as Koch ("cook") or 
Bauer ("farmer"). We applied what we believed to be a solid statistical approach, using 
generalized estimating equations first and during the review process applied hierarchical 
linear modelling and controlled for various potential third variables, including linear controls 
for name frequency. A post-publication re-analysis by Uri Simonsohn using an expanded 
version of our dataset identified a curvilinear name-frequency confound in the data, whereas 
we had used only linear controls. Applying the improved matched-names analysis to the 
larger dataset conclusively overturned the original paper’s conclusions. Germans with noble 
and non-noble names are equally well represented in managerial positions. We subsequently 
co-authored a collaborative commentary (Silberzahn et al., 2014) reporting the new results. 
This experience inspired us to pursue our line of work on crowdsourcing data analysis, in 
which the same dataset is distributed to many different analysts to test the same hypothesis 
and the effect size estimates are compared (Silberzahn et al., 2018; Silberzahn & Uhlmann, 
2015). 
Statement on Smith and Zentall (2016) by Thomas R. Zentall 
We have found, paradoxically, that pigeons are indifferent between a signaled 50% 
reinforcement alternative (leading half of the time to a stimulus that signals 100% 
reinforcement and otherwise to a stimulus that signals 0% reinforcement) over a guaranteed 
100% reinforcement alternative. We concluded that the value of the signal for reinforcement 
(100% in both cases) determines choice and curiously, the signal for the absence of 
reinforcement has no negative value. More recently, however, using a similar design but 
involving extended training, we found that there was actually a significant preference for the 
50% signaled reinforcement alternative over the 100% reinforcement alternative (Case & 
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Zentall, 2018). This finding required that we acknowledge that there is an additional 
mechanism involved, namely the contrast between what was expected and what was obtained 
(positive contrast). In the case of the 50% reinforcement alternative 50% reinforcement was 
expected but on half of the trials a signal indicated that 100% reinforcement would be 
obtained ("elation," analogous to the emotion felt by a gambler who hits the jackpot). Choice 
of the 100% reinforcement alternative comes with an expectation of 100% reinforcement and 
as 100% reinforcement is obtained there no positive contrast and no elation. The recognition 
of our error in not acknowledging positive contrast has led to a better understanding of the 
motivation that gamblers have to gamble in the face of repeated losses and occasional wins. 
Statement on Strand, Brown, and Barbour (2018) by Julia Strand 
The paper reported that when participants listened to spoken words in noise, the 
cognitive resources necessary to understand the speech (referred to as “listening effort”) were 
reduced when the speech was accompanied by dynamic visual stimulus—a circle that 
modulated with the amplitude of the speech. When attempting to replicate and extend that 
work, I discovered an error in the original stimulus presentation program that was responsible 
for the observed effect. The listening effort task we used was response time based, so the 
critical comparison was participant response times in conditions with and without the visual 
stimulus. There was an unintentional delay set in the timer of the condition without the visual 
stimulus, leading to artificially slowed response times in that condition. We contacted the 
journal and they invited us to submit a replacement article. Given that the timing delay 
affected every observation for one condition in a systematic way, it was straightforward to 
reanalyze the data and present the results as they would have been without the error. The 
original paper was not retracted, but now links to the new paper (Strand, Brown, & Barbour, 
2020) that presents the corrected results. 
LOSS-OF-CONFIDENCE PROJECT   16 
 
Statement on Vazire (2010) by Simine Vazire 
In this article, I suggested a model in which self-reports are more accurate than peer 
reports for traits that are low in observability and low in evaluativeness, whereas peer reports 
are more accurate than self-reports for traits that are high in observability and high in 
evaluativeness. The main issue was that I ran many more analyses than I reported, and I 
cherry-picked which results to report. This is basically p-hacking but since most of my results 
were not statistically significant, I did not quite successfully p-hack by the strict definition. 
Still, I cherry-picked the results that made the contrast between self- and peer-accuracy the 
most striking, and that fit with the story about evaluativeness and observability. That story 
was post hoc and chosen after I had seen the pattern of results. 
Statement on Willén and Strömwall (2012) by Rebecca M. Willén 
This study evaluated the criteria used by Swedish courts for assessing credibility of 
plaintiffs’ accounts. The main reasons for my loss of confidence in the results reported are 
listed below. 
1. The main coder (myself) was not blind to the veracity of the statements. 
In addition, the main coder had also conducted the interviews, which 
means that she might have been influenced by the memory of non-
verbal cues which were not supposed to have influenced the codings. 
The second coder was blind, and did indeed come to different 
conclusions in his codings. These differences may have been a 
consequence of the conditions and non-verbal cues being known to the 
main coder, and this possibility remained undisclosed in the article. 
2. All four hypotheses described as confirmatory in the introduction of the 
paper were in fact not formalised until after the data had been collected. 
It could be argued that the first three hypotheses were "obvious" and 
thereby implicitly already decided upon. The fourth hypothesis, 
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however, was far from obvious and it was the result of exploratory 
analyses made by myself. 
3. No gender differences were predicted and gender was never planned to 
be analysed at all. The gender findings are thus the result of exploratory 
analyses. This fact is however never made very explicit; instead are 
these (unexpected) results highlighted even in the abstract. 
That said, I do think there is reason to believe that one particular main finding is 
worth trying to replicate: "False and truthful confessions by 30 offenders were analysed, and 
few significant effects were obtained." That is, true and false statements by criminally 
experienced offenders might be more difficult to distinguish than true and false statements 
provided by the typical participants in deception and interrogation research (i.e., 
undergraduates without criminal experience). 
Statement on Witt and Proffitt (2008) by Jessica K. Witt 
The paper reported that squeezing a rubber ball interferes with the processes 
necessary for the perceiver’s ability to reach to a target to affect perceived distance to the 
target (Experiment 3a). Participants judged the distance to targets that were beyond the reach 
of the arm, then picked up a conductor’s baton and reached to them. One group of 
participants applied a constant, firm pressure on a rubber ball while making their distance 
judgments, whereas another group did not. The analysis reported in the paper used an 
incorrectly specified model. Specifically, we calculated the mean estimated distance for each 
participant at each distance for a total of 10 estimates per participant, then analyzed these 
means as if they were independent observations. This inflated the degrees of freedom, which 
resulted in lower p values. When the data are analyzed correctly, the critical effect of ball 
squeeze on estimated distance is not significant, F(1, 14) = 2.31, p = .151, ηp2 = .14. The 
mean difference between the two conditions was 3.5 cm, and the standard deviation for the 
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mean estimate across all participants was 4.8 cm. To achieve 80% power to find an effect of 
d = .73, we would have needed 33 participants per condition. Instead, we only had 8 
participants per condition. Thus, we do not have enough data to make claims about whether 
squeezing the ball had an effect. This lack of sufficient data was confirmed by calculating the 
Bayes factor for a two-sample t-test comparing mean estimated distance across the two 
squeeze conditions. The Bayes factor was 0.90, which means the data support neither the null 
or the alternative hypothesis. Incorrect model specification and subsequent discovery of lack 
of sufficient power also applies to Experiments 1, 2, and 3b. Experiment 4 is believed to have 
been analyzed correctly based on the reported degrees of freedom, but that data has been lost 
and therefore cannot be confirmed. 
Statement on Yarkoni, Braver, Gray, and Green (2005) by Tal Yarkoni 
This study used a dynamic decision-making task to investigate the neural correlates of 
temporally-extended decision-making. The central claim was that activation in areas of right 
lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) strongly and selectively predicted choice behavior in two 
different conditions; peak between-subject brain-behavior correlations were around r = .75. I 
now think most of the conclusions drawn in this article were absurd on their face. My 
understanding of statistics has improved a bit since writing the paper, and it’s now 
abundantly clear to me that (a) I p-hacked to a considerable degree (e.g., the choice of cluster 
thresholds was essentially arbitrary), and (b) because of the "winner’s curse", statistically 
significant effect sizes from underpowered studies cannot be taken at face value (see Yarkoni, 
2009). Beyond these methodological problems, I also now think the kinds of theoretical 
explanations I proposed in the paper were ludicrous in their simplicity and naivete—so the 
results would have told us essentially nothing even if they were statistically sound (see 
Meehl, 1967, 1990). 
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Discussion of the Loss-of-Confidence Statements 
The studies for which we received statements spanned a wide range of psychological 
domains (stereotypes, working memory, auditory perception, visual cognition, face 
perception, personality and well-being, biologically-driven individual differences, social 
cognition, decision-making in non-human animals, deception detection) and employed a 
diverse range of methods (cognitive tasks, implicit and explicit individual differences 
measures, archival data analyses, semi-structured interviews, functional MRI), demonstrating 
the broad relevance of our project. Overall, the respective original articles had been cited 
1,559 times as of April 27, 2020 according to Google Scholar, but the number of citations 
varied widely, from 9 to 740. The reasons given for the submitters’ loss of confidence also 
varied widely, with some statements providing multiple reasons. Broadly speaking, however, 
we can group the explanations into three general categories: 
1. Methodological Error. Five of the statements reported methodological 
errors in the broadest sense. In three instances, submitters (Jones & 
DeBruine; Silberzahn & Uhlmann; Witt) lost confidence in their 
findings upon realizing that their key results stemmed from misspecified 
statistical models. In those three cases, the submitters discovered, post-
publication, that a more appropriate model specification resulted in the 
key effect becoming statistically non-significant. In another instance, 
Carlsson reported that, upon reconsideration, two studies included in his 
article actually tested different hypotheses–a reanalysis testing the same 
hypotheses in Study 2 actually failed to fully support the findings from 
Study 1. Lastly, Strand lost confidence when she found out that a 
programming error invalidated her findings. 
2. Invalid inference. Four of the statements reported invalid inferences in 
the broadest sense. In two cases (Heyman and Yarkoni), the submitters 
attributed their loss of confidence to problems of validity—that is, to a 
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discrepancy between what the reported results actually showed (a 
statistically significant effect of some manipulation or measure) and 
what the paper claimed to show (a general relationship between two 
latent constructs). In a similar vein, Zentall lost confidence in a 
conclusion when a follow-up experiment revealed that an extension of 
the experimental procedures suggested that the original mechanism was 
not sufficient to account for the phenomenon. While the latter Loss-of-
Confidence statement might be closest to normative assumptions about 
how science advances–new empirical insights lead to a revision of past 
conclusions–it also raises interesting questions: At what point should 
researchers lose confidence in a methodological decision made in one 
study based on the results of other studies that are, in principle, also 
fallible? 
3. P-hacking. Seven of the statements (Carlsson, Chabris, Lucas, Yarkoni, 
Schmukle, Vazire, and Willén) reported some form of p-hacking—i.e., 
failing to properly account for researcher degrees of freedom when 
conducting or reporting the analyses. We hasten to emphasize that our 
usage of “p-hacking” here does not imply any willful attempt to mislead. 
Indeed, some of the submitters noted that the problems in question 
stemmed from their poor (at the time) understanding of relevant 
statistical considerations. The statement by Lucas also highlights how 
subtle researcher degrees of freedom can affect analyses: Even though 
the justification for a specific exclusion criterion still seems compelling, 
the researcher would not have been motivated to double-check data 
points if the desired results had emerged in the initial analysis. 
Results and Discussion of the Anonymous Online Survey 
Overall, 316 scientists completed the survey. Most (93%) reported being affiliated 
with a university or a research institute, and all career stages from graduate students to 
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tenured professors were represented. We did not limit the survey to particular fields of 
research but asked respondents to indicate their department (if applicable); 43% did not 
report a department, 37% worked at a psychology department, and the remaining respondents 
were distributed over a broad range of fields (e.g., business, economics, medicine). Almost 
all respondents reported working either in Europe (44%) or the US (47%). Figure 1 provides 
an overview of the survey results. 
 
Figure 1. An overview of the findings from the Loss-of-Confidence survey. 
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Almost half of the respondents (44%) reported losing confidence in at least one of 
their findings. Another 14% were not sure whether they had lost confidence according to our 
definition for a variety of reasons–for example, some reported that their confidence in one of 
their own research articles was low to begin with; some had lost confidence in their 
theoretical explanation, but not in the general effect—or conversely, in the effect but not in 
the theory; others doubted whether their results would generalize to other contexts. 
Respondents who reported losing confidence were then asked to elaborate on the case for 
which they felt most responsible.4 Of the respondents who stated that they had experienced a 
loss of confidence, more than half (56%) said that it was due to a mistake or shortcoming in 
judgment on the part of the researchers, and roughly one in four (28%) took primary 
responsibility for the error. 
Strikingly, the primary reason indicated for a loss of confidence was self-admitted 
questionable research practices (such as p-hacking and selective reporting; 52%). However, a 
broad variety of other reasons were also reported. The loss of confidence was a matter of 
public record in fewer than a fifth of the reported cases (17%), and if it was a matter of public 
record, the outlets primarily chosen (statement in later publication, conference presentation, 
social media posting) were not directly linked to the original research article. Respondents 
whose loss of confidence was not public reported multiple reasons for the lack of disclosure. 
Many felt insufficiently sure about the loss of confidence to proceed (68%). Some stated the 
belief that public disclosure was unnecessary, as the finding had not attracted much attention 
                                                
4	Respondents	who	were	not	sure	whether	they	had	experienced	a	loss	of	confidence	could	
also	answer	the	follow-up	questions.	However,	many	decided	not	to	answer,	and	for	those	
who	answered,	responses	are	hard	to	interpret	given	the	broad	variety	of	scenarios	they	were	
referring	 to.	 Thus,	 we	 decided	 to	 restrict	 the	 following	 analyses	 to	 respondents	 with	 an	
unambiguous	loss	of	confidence.	
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(46%); expressed concerns about hurting the feelings of co-authors (33%); or cited the lack of 
an appropriate venue (25%); uncertainty about how to best communicate the matter (25%); 
and worries about how the loss of confidence would be perceived (24%). 
On the whole, these survey results suggest a nuanced view of losses of confidence. 
Researchers may start to question their own findings for a broad variety of reasons, and 
different factors may then keep them from publicly disclosing this information. Collectively, 
the responses suggest that a sizeable proportion of active researchers have lost confidence in 
at least one of their findings—often due to a recognized error of their own commission. 
It is important to note that our respondents do not constitute a representative sample 
of researchers. Further, estimating article-level rather than researcher-level loss of confidence 
requires assumptions and extrapolations.5 Thus, caution should be exercised when 
interpreting the specific numerical estimates reported here. Nevertheless, one can attempt a 
very conservative extrapolation: over one million academic papers are currently published 
each year (Jinha, 2010). Supposing that at least a third of these are empirical research reports, 
and that even just one percent these reports are affected, that still leaves us with thousands of 
articles published each year that will eventually lose the confidence of at least some of their 
authors—often due to known errors, yet typically without any public disclosure. 
                                                
5 In the survey, we also asked researchers to indicate in how many of their articles they had lost confidence. An 
analysis of these numbers suggested that respondents had collectively lost confidence in more than 10% of their 
publications in total; or more than 7% counting only those articles in which they had lost confidence due to an 
error for which they took primary responsibility. Of course, these are extrapolations based on retrospective self-
reports, and we cannot assume respondents are able to give perfect estimates of the relevant quantities. For this 
reason, a number of our key analyses focus on the respondents’ description of the one case for which they felt 
most responsible. 
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General Discussion 
The Loss-of-Confidence Project raises a number of questions about how we should 
interpret individual self-corrections. 
First, on a substantive level, how should we think about published empirical studies in 
cases where the authors have explicitly expressed a loss of confidence in the results? One 
intuitive view is that authors have no privileged authority over “their” findings, and thus such 
statements should have no material impact on a reader’s evaluation. On the other hand, even 
if authors lack any privileged authority over findings they initially reported, they clearly often 
have privileged access to relevant information. This is particularly salient for the p-hacking 
disclosures reported in the Loss-of-Confidence statements. Absent explicit statements of this 
kind, readers would most likely not be able to definitively identify the stated problems in the 
original report. In such cases, we think it is appropriate for readers to update their evaluations 
of the reported results to accommodate the new information. 
Even in cases where a disclosure contributes no new methodological information, one 
might argue that the mere act of self-correction should be accorded a certain weight. Authors 
have presumably given greater thought to, and are more aware of, their own study’s potential 
problems and implications than a casual reader. The original authors may also be particularly 
biased to evaluate their own studies favorably—so if they have nonetheless lost confidence, 
this might heuristically suggest that the evidence against the original finding is particularly 
compelling. 
Second, on a meta-level, how should we think about the reception our project 
received? On the one hand, one could argue that the response was about as positive as could 
reasonably be expected. Given the unconventional nature of the project and the potentially 
high perceived cost of public self-correction, the project organizers (JMR, CFC, TY) were 
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initially unsure whether the project would receive any submissions. From this perspective, 
even the thirteen submissions we ultimately received could be considered a clear success and 
a testament to the current introspective and self-critical climate in psychology. 
On the other hand, the survey responses we received suggest that the kinds of errors 
disclosed in the statements are not rare. Approximately 12% of the 316 survey respondents 
reported losing confidence in at least one of their articles for reasons that matched our 
stringent submission criteria (i.e., due to mistakes that the respondent took personal 
responsibility for), and nearly half acknowledged a loss of confidence more generally. 
This suggests that potentially hundreds, if not thousands, of psychological researchers 
could have submitted loss-of-confidence statements, but did not do so. There are many 
plausible reasons for this, including not having heard of the project. However, we think that 
at least partially, the small number of submitted statements points to a gap between 
researchers’ ideals and their actual behavior—that is, public self-correction is desirable in the 
abstract, but difficult in practice. 
Fostering a Culture of Self-Correction 
As we have seen, researchers report a variety of reasons for both their losses of 
confidence, and their hesitation to publicly disclose a change in thinking. However, we would 
like to suggest that there is a broader underlying factor: in the current research environment, 
self-correction, or even just critical reconsideration of one’s past work, is often 
disincentivized professionally. The opportunity costs of a self-correction are high; time spent 
on correcting past mistakes and missteps is time that cannot be spent on new research efforts, 
and the resulting self-correction is less likely to be judged a genuine scientific contribution. 
Moreover, researchers may worry about self-correction potentially backfiring. Corrections 
that focus on specific elements from an earlier study might be perceived as undermining the 
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value of the study as a whole, including parts that are in fact unaffected by the error. 
Researchers might also fear that a self-correction that exposes flaws in their work will 
damage their reputation, and perhaps even undermine the credibility of their research record 
as a whole. 
To tackle these obstacles to self-correction, changes to our research culture are 
necessary. Scientists make errors (and this statement is certainly not limited to psychological 
researchers, see, e.g., Eisenman, Meier, & Norris, 2014; García-Berthou & Alcaraz, 2004; 
Salter et al., 2014; Westra et al., 2011), and rectifying these errors is a genuine scientific 
contribution—whether it is done by a third party or the original authors. Scientific societies 
could consider whether they want to more formally acknowledge efforts by authors to correct 
their own work. Confronted with researchers who publicly admit to errors, other researchers 
should keep in mind that willingness to admit error is not a reliable indicator of propensity to 
commit errors—after all, errors are frequent throughout the scientific record. On the contrary, 
given the potential (or perceived) costs of individual self-corrections, public admission of 
error could be taken as a credible signal that the issuer values the correctness of the scientific 
record. However, ultimately, given the ubiquity of mistakes, we believe that individual self-
corrections should become a routine part of science, rather than an extraordinary occurrence.  
Different Media for Self-Correction 
Unfortunately, good intentions are not enough. Even when researchers are committed 
to public self-correction, it is often far from obvious how to proceed. Sometimes, self-
correction is hindered by the inertia of journals and publishers. For example, a recent study 
suggested that many medical journals published correction letters only after a significant 
delay, if at all (Goldacre et al., 2019), and authors who tried to retract or correct their own 
articles after publication have encountered delays and reluctance from journals (e.g., Grens, 
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2015). Even without such obstacles, there is presently no standardized protocol describing 
what steps should be taken when a loss of confidence has occurred. 
Among the participants of the loss-of-confidence project, Fisher, Hahn, DeBruine, 
and Jones (2015) decided to retract their article after they became aware of their misspecified 
model. But researchers may often be reluctant to initiate a retraction, given that retractions 
occur most commonly as a result of scientific misconduct (Fang et al., 2012) and are 
therefore often associated in the public imagination with cases of deliberate fraud. To prevent 
this unwelcome conflation and encourage more frequent disclosure of errors, journals could 
introduce a new label for retractions initiated by the original authors (e.g., “Authorial 
Expression of Concern” or “voluntary withdrawal”; see Alberts et al., 2015). Furthermore, an 
option for authorial amendments beyond simple corrections (up to and including formal 
versioning of published articles) could be helpful. 
Thus, it is not at all clear that widespread adoption of retractions would be an 
effective, fair, or appropriate approach. Willén (2018) argued that retraction of articles in 
which questionable practices were employed could deter researchers from being honest about 
their past actions. Furthermore, retracting papers because of QRPs known to be widespread 
(e.g., John et al., 2012) could have the unintended side effect that some researchers might 
naively conclude that a lack of a retraction implies a lack of QRPs. Hence, Willén (2018) 
suggested that all articles should be supplemented by transparent retroactive disclosure 
statements. In this manner, the historical research record remains intact, as information would 
be added rather than removed. 
Preprint servers (such as PsyArXiv.com) and other online repositories already enable 
authors to easily disclose additional information to supplement their published articles or 
express their doubts. However, such information also needs to be discoverable. Established 
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databases such as PubMed could add links to any relevant additional information provided by 
the authors. Curate Science (curatescience.org), a new online platform dedicated to increasing 
the transparency of science, is currently implementing retroactive statements that could allow 
researchers to disclose additional information (e.g., additional outcome measures or 
experimental manipulations not reported in the original article) in a straightforward, 
structured manner. 
Another, more radical step would be to move scientific publication entirely online and 
make articles dynamic rather than static, such that they can be updated based on new 
evidence (with the previous version being archived) without any need for retraction (Nosek & 
Bar-Anan, 2012). For example, the Living Reviews journal series in physics by Springer 
Nature allows authors to update review articles to incorporate new developments. 
The right course of action once one has decided to self-correct will necessarily depend 
on the specifics of the situation, such as the reason for the loss of confidence; publication 
norms that can vary between research fields and evolve over time; and the position that the 
finding takes within the wider literature. For example, a simple but consequential 
computational error may warrant a full retraction, whereas a more complex confound may 
warrant a more extensive commentary. In research fields in which the published record is 
perceived as more definitive, a retraction may be more appropriate than in research fields in 
which published findings have a more tentative status. And an error in a manuscript that plays 
a rather minor role in the context of the wider literature may be sufficiently addressed in a 
corrigendum, whereas an error in a highly cited study may require a more visible medium for 
the self-correction to reach all relevant actors. 
That said, we think that both the scientific community and the broader public would 
profit if additional details about the study, or the author’s re-assessment of it, were always 
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made public, and always closely linked to the original article—ideally in databases and 
search results as well as the publisher’s website and archival copies. A cautionary tale 
illustrates the need for such a system: In January 2018, a major German national weekly 
newspaper published an article (Kara, 2018a) which uncritically cited the findings of 
Silberzahn and Uhlmann (2013). Once the journalist had been alerted that these findings had 
been corrected in Silberzahn, Simonsohn, and Uhlmann (2014), she wrote a correction to her 
newspaper article which was published within less than a month of the previous article (Kara, 
2018b), demonstrating swift journalistic self-correction and making a strong point that any 
post-publication update to a scientific article should be made clearly visible to all readers of 
the original article. 
Outlook 
All of these measures could help to transform the cultural norms of the scientific 
community, bringing it closer to the ideal of self-correction. Naturally, it is hard to predict 
which ones will prove particularly fruitful, and changing the norms of any community is a 
non-trivial endeavor. However, it might be encouraging to recall that over the last few years, 
scientific practices in psychology have already changed dramatically (Nelson, Simmons, & 
Simonsohn, 2018). Hence, a shift towards a culture of self-correction may not be completely 
unrealistic, and psychology with its increasing focus on openness may even serve as a role 
model for other fields of research to transform their practices. 
Finally, it is quite possible that fears about negative reputational consequences are 
exaggerated. It is unclear whether, and to what extent, self-retractions actually damage 
researchers’ reputations (Bishop, 2018). There is some evidence that self-retractions do not 
damage reputation as unambiguously as people think (Bishop, 2018). Recent acts of self-
correction such as those by Carney (2016), which inspired our efforts in this project, 
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Silberzahn and Uhlmann (Silberzahn et al., 2014), Inzlicht (2016), Willén (2018), and 
Gervais (2017) have received positive reactions from within the psychological community. 
They remind us that science can advance at a faster pace than one funeral at a time. 
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